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INTRODUCTION
Over the last two years, there has been an extraordinary amount of
historical research and writing done on the subject of Nazi Gold.
Nazi Gold includes not only the fate of monetary gold looted by Nazi
Germany from the wartime captive nations of conquered Europe, but
also the gold and other valuables stolen from the individual victims
of the Nazis, as well as the postwar disposition of the overseas assets
of the German government and citizens. Gill Bennett, an esteemed
colleague and the chief historian in the British Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office, led the way with her groundbreaking British re-
port released in September 1996. That report and succeeding reports
and cooperation were central factors in helping the United States
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prepare two reports under the direction of Under Secretary of State
Stuart E. Eizenstat.
The London Conference on Nazi Gold in December 1997 pro-
vided an unparalleled forum for historians and experts of forty na-
tions to gather together and review and discuss in greater detail the
complexities of Nazi Gold. A great number of reports and interven-
tions were presented on substantive matters, as well as on the meth-
odological modalities of this research and the special archival possi-
bilities and problems they raised. The London Conference is the
greatest effort to date to shed light on the real nature, fate, and extent
to which Nazi Germany resorted to looting and theft to carry on its
terrible war against humanity, as well as the consequence of that
program upon millions of individual victims-Jews and others.
Historical research into the issues of Nazi Gold and other German
assets, as well as the fate of the valuables and other properties of the
individual victims in Europe, has continued and broadened since the
London Conference. Twelve national commissions took up these
matters in Europe as well as in Argentina. A number of these com-
missions have completed and published final and interim reports on
work and research still underway. As a way of approaching a rough
appraisal of the work in progress on Nazi Gold issues, this presenta-
tion will address briefly the contents of several of these reports, in
particular those of Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
States.
I. SPAIN'S COMMISSION
The report of the Spanish Historical Commission, which was pub-
licly released in May 1998, presents a careful and comprehensive ac-
count of the wartime flow of monetary gold into and out of wartime
Spain based upon the principal public archives of Spain. The report
emphasizes the importance of the disastrous state of Spain's econ-
omy after the Spanish Civil War in determining the nature of Spain's
neutrality in World War II, and it examines Spain's efforts to rebuild
the gold reserve it lost during the Civil War. Spain, which accumu-
lated a debt of $212 million to Germany by the end of its Civil War,
carried on trade with Germany during World War II through a
clearing arrangement that obviated direct payments for particular
shipments of exports and imports. By the end of the War, Spain
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amassed a favorable trade balance with Germany of $76 million. The
United States recognized that Spanish trade with Germany in wolf-
ram and in other critical commodities was primarily conducted under
a clearing or barter agreement. While Germany became Spain's prin-
cipal trading partner in World War II, a substantial Swiss-Spanish
trade centered on the exchange of Swiss machinery and chemicals
for Spanish agricultural products. Britain's trade with Spain focused
upon preclusive purchases of goods to deny them to Germany, while
the United States made its shipments of wheat, cotton, and oil con-
tingent upon Spain's cooperation with Allied economic warfare
measures against Germany.
The report of the Spanish Commission generally confirms the
broad outlines of the United States May 1997 preliminary report and
the June 1998 supplementary report. The Spanish report, however,
provides new details and information about the wartime flow and
postwar use of gold that go beyond what was presented in the United
States report. The Spanish Commission concludes that Spain pur-
chased 67.4 tons of monetary gold during the War, 38.6 tons of
which were acquired from Swiss banks while 7.3 tons were acquired
directly from Germany. The Commission report further points out
that it was upon the basis of Allied-Spanish agreements of 1948 and
the joint analysis of Spanish gold holdings that resulted in an agree-
ment to identify and transfer of only 8 ingots looted monetary gold to
the Tripartite Gold Commission. The Spanish Commission takes
proper pride in the thoroughness of its review of official gold trans-
actions but it generously holds open the possibility of revising its
findings if investigation uncovers new information.
II. SWEDEN'S COMMISSION
Reports by the Swedish Commission on Jewish Assets in Sweden
at the Time of the Second World War and by the Swedish Independ-
ent Archives Inquiry on Sweden's Gold Transactions with Nazi
Germany also confirm and correspond with the information pre-
sented in the two United States reports. They do, however, provide
much greater detail and broader examination of the issues. Both
Swedish reports make clear that Sweden purchased 17.9 tons of gold
from the German Reichsbank account in the Swiss National Bank,
but that Sweden purchased no gold directly from the Swiss National
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Bank. The Swedish reports present a very detailed accounting of
Swedish gold acquisitions, purchases, and transfers with the
Reichsbank and calculate this total at 59,697 kilograms. Gold looted
from Belgium and the Netherlands totaled 7,311 and 8,607 kilo-
grams, respectively.
The Swedish Commission reports that the postwar Allied-Swedish
negotiations led to the payment of about 7.2 tons of gold in restitu-
tion to the Tripartite Gold Commission in 1949 to settle the Belgian
looted gold claims, and to the restitution of approximately six tons of
gold to the TGC in 1955 to settle Netherlands claims. Going beyond
many of the particulars presented in the United States reports, the
Swedish reports provide thorough detail on both how and when the
looted gold was acquired, as well as on how the negotiations with the
Allies over restitution proceeded during the postwar years.
III. SWITZERLAND'S INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION
In their Interim Report, "Switzerland and the Gold Transactions of
the Second World War," Professor Bergier and his colleagues on the
Swiss Independent Commission of Experts presented a monumental
description and analysis of financial transactions by Swiss banks and
other institutions during the War and of Switzerland's role and con-
duct as a European financial center. With eminently careful scholar-
ship and great thoroughness, Professor Bergier and his colleagues
examined the amounts of gold acquired by Nazi Germany during the
War, as well as the quantities transferred to Swiss institutions. Their
calculations confirm the estimates developed in the United States
preliminary report of May 1997. In fact, the Swiss Report found even
larger totals; an estimated $450 million in gold transfers compared to
the $414 million maximum estimated soon after the War by the Al-
lied experts.
The Swiss Interim Report of May 1998 concludes that 79 percent
of all Reichsbank gold shipments to other countries were routed
through Switzerland, demonstrating the centrality of Swiss banking
institutions to the German war effort and Switzerland's emergence as
a conduit for gold looted from occupied Europe by Germany. The
Swiss researchers have also made clear that their investigations show
that the gold acquired by the Reichsbank to finance the German war
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effort included a quantity of victim gold, which they estimate
amounted to at least $2.9 million. No evidence has yet indicated that
the authorities managing the Swiss National Bank were aware of the
inclusion of gold stolen from death camp victims in the shipments
received from Germany.
The Swiss Interim Report is uncompromising in its evaluation of
the conduct of Swiss banking authorities. It notes the clear awareness
of these officials that Germany had amassed a large quantity of
looted monetary gold and their indifference or unwillingness to dis-
tinguish between legally obtained gold and looted gold supplied by
the Reichsbank. Professor Bergier's colleagues demonstrate that by
mid-1942 the significance of the origin of the gold being supplied to
Switzerland was well known outside the small group managing the
Swiss National Bank. While the Allied warnings beginning in early
1943 regarding the neutral states' acceptance of looted gold from
Germany caused Swiss authorities to begin to take precautionary
measures, the Swiss Interim Report shows that Swiss banking
authorities consciously used the concept of "good faith" as a protec-
tive device to allow the continuation of "business as usual" with
Germany until nearly the end of the War.
The imposing Interim Report of the Swiss Independent Commis-
sion marks only the first step in a still more ambitious if necessary
historical review. Its investigations of external trade patterns, official
trade policy, and general and economic and political conditions dur-
ing the War are eagerly awaited.
IV. THE UNITED STATES REPORT
This presentation will now review, in somewhat greater detail, the
contents of the United States supplementary report of June 1998, a
companion to the original United States preliminary report of May
1997. The first report focused upon providing a road map through
fifteen million pages of official United States documents describing
what United States officials knew and did about the movements of
looted monetary gold and other assets to the neutral nations, particu-
larly Switzerland, during World War II. The second report expands
on the information presented in the first report to show how gold,
much of it looted, was used to finance the wartime trade of the Euro-
pean neutral nations, which significantly sustained the German war
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effort well into the closing phases of the War. In examining the im-
portant economic relationships of the neutrals, other than Switzer-
land, the second or supplementary United States report also sought to
make more clear that neutrality during World War II was not a
monolithic concept or uniform set of actions, but rather it took dif-
ferent forms in different countries depending upon their specific
wartime circumstances, the attitudes of their leaders, and the endur-
ing features of their own economies and geography.
With respect to the wartime gold transactions that allowed Nazi
Germany to finance a substantial portion of its war effort by paying
for its wartime imports from the neutral nations directly or indirectly
in gold, the second United States report examines in greater detail
than the first report of May 1997 the scope of knowledge of Ameri-
can and other Allied officials and experts regarding these transac-
tions. Through diplomatic channels, as well as from information pro-
vided by intelligence activities, the United States and its Allies
sought to demonstrate their commitment to their warnings of January
1943 and February 1944 against accepting transfers of assets from
Germany. Additionally the Allies displayed their intention to imple-
ment Bretton Woods Resolution VI of August 1944 warning against
the dissipation of German assets and gold and asking for cooperation
in their recovery and restitution.
The second United States report examines, in far greater detail
than the May 1997 preliminary report, the circumstances of the
postwar negotiations that the United States, Britain, and France con-
ducted, on behalf of the larger family of Allied nations, with the
wartime neutral nations, apart from Switzerland. The report makes
quite clear that these protracted negotiations failed to meet the origi-
nal agreed Allied goals: the restitution of nearly $500 million in
looted gold and the liquidation of as much as $1 billion dollars of
German external assets to fund the reconstruction of postwar liber-
ated Europe and to provide relief for Jewish and other non-
repatriable refugees. The report seeks, in a spirit of investigation
rather than judgment, to demonstrate how and why so comparatively
little was returned to the Tripartite Gold Commission to meet the
claims of fifteen countries. The TGC recovered less than $20 million
-nearly $15 million of that coming from Sweden-of up to $240
million in looted gold acquired by the wartime neutrals, apart from
Switzerland.
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The United States remains committed to continuing efforts to elu-
cidate the ultimate destination of looted gold for which there is no
transaction record. Researchers in the United States and in other
countries are encouraged to continue their valuable collaboration to
identify and clarify the historical record in this important area.
One of the most important discoveries in the second United States
report, presented in an annex, is the new information about the prop-
erty of Holocaust victims incorporated into the Reichsbank gold re-
serves, which was collected by my colleagues at the United States
Department of Justice. This new information leads to the conclusion
that the amount of victim gold is far higher than previously thought
and that the record is still far from complete. This new research also
traces some of this victim gold to sales on the free gold market else-
where in Europe.
The two United States reports provide road maps through the ex-
tensive United States governmental archival holdings on these sub-
jects. While there are no plans for further research or reports on the
subject of looted gold, the United States government looks forward
to working with historians and experts in other commissions and
governments in synthesizing information, refining conclusions, and
above all, working for the identification and openness of all relevant
records and archives.
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